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Poverty Alleviation Programs, FDI-led Growth and Child Labour
under Agricultural Dualism
1. Introduction
Abject poverty has been attributed to be the root cause behind the widespread existence
of child labour in the developing countries. Therefore, it is a commonly held view that
poverty  alleviation  programs should vigorously be  resorted  to  for  mitigating  the
problem.
1 Empirical  studies  have  revealed  that  the  incidence  of  child  labour  has
decreased satisfactorily in most of the developing economies
2 although incomes of the
poorer section of the population have not changed significantly in absolute terms over the
last two decades.
3
The problem of child labour has two sides: demand and supply. Countries with high
incidence  of  poverty  undertake  policies  which  are  designed  to  increase  earning
opportunities  of  the  poor.  Consequently,  these  policies  are  expected  to  produce
favourable effect on the incidence of child labour through the supply side. A pertinent
question  is  whether policies  which  address only the  supply  side  of  the  problem can
indeed be effective in alleviating this problem. This is particularly important because of
the empirical findings that the incidence of child labour in the developing nations has
decreased satisfactorily although poverty has not changed much during the liberalized
economic regime. These evidences suggest that favourable effect on child labour must
1 See World Development Report (1995), Basu and Van (1998), Basu (2000) and Bonnet (1993)
among others.
2 ILO (2006) has reported that the number of economically active children in the 5-14 age group
declined by 11 per cent in 2004 from the 2000 figure. The decline is sharpest for Latin America
and Caribbean, whereas Asia and Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa registered very small decline in
activity rates.
3 See, for example, Wade (2004), Reddy and Minoiu (2005), Wade and Wolf (2002), Khan
(1998) and Tendulkar et al. (1996).3
have come from the demand side. This urgently calls for theoretical explanation that
might be able to show why policy interventions affecting the supply side alone cannot
effectively solve the prevalence of the evil in the system and demand side policies should
be given more priorities so as to tackle the child labour situation in the society.
According to ILO (2002) the concentration of child labour is the highest in the rural
sector of a developing economy and child labour is used intensively directly or indirectly
in the agricultural sector
4. Besides, agricultural dualism is a common symptom of the
developing countries. The distinction between advanced and backward agriculture can be
made  on  the  basis  of  inputs  used,  economies  of  scale,  efficiency  and  elasticity  of
substitution  between  different  factors  of  production. In  backward  agriculture,  the
production  techniques  are  primitive,  use  of  capital  is  very  low  and  child  labour  can
almost do whatever adult labour does. Farming in backward agriculture is mostly done by
using  bullocks  and  ploughs  and  the  cattle-feeding  is  entirely  done  by  child  labour.
5
Besides, at the time of sowing of seeds and harvest children are often used in the family
farms for helping adult members of the family. The advanced agricultural sector, on the
other hand, uses mechanised techniques of production and uses agricultural machineries
like tractors, seeders/planters, sprayers and harvesters etc. and therefore does not require
child labour in its production process.
Agriculture in many countries is supported by government’s subsidy policies in the form
of price support, export subsidy, credit support etc.  In a developing country like India,
farmers in backward agriculture are given price support with a view to protect themselves
from sharp fall in their product prices during the times of over supply in the market.
government’s Minimum Support Price (or Producers Support Price) mechanism is a very
common  form  of  government  subsidy  policy  directed  towards  backward  agriculture.
6
4 According to the ILO (2002) report (figure 4, pp. 36), more than 70 per cent of economically
active children in the developing countries are engaged in agriculture and allied sectors.
5 See Gupta (2000) in this context.
6 See footnote 9 for details.4
These types of subsidy scheme are designed to benefit the poorer section of the working
population who are the potential suppliers of child labour. It is therefore natural to expect
that these fiscal measures will raise the earning opportunities of the poor households
which in turn will lower the supply of child labour by these families through positive
income effect. However, the matter is not as straightforward as it appears to be at the first
sight.  This is because apart from their impact on adult wages, these policies affect the
output composition of different sectors and the demand for child labour and therefore
earning  opportunities by  children  as  well.    An  expansion  of  backward  agriculture
resulting from  an increase in Producers Support Price , for example, will result in a
higher demand for child labour and raise the use of child labour in the economy. Even if
there is a positive income effect due to increase in adult wages, the net effect on child
labour may be perverse. Any policy effect on the child labour incidence should, therefore,
be carried out in a multi-sector general equilibrium framework so as to capture various
demand and supply linkages that may exist in the system.
The existing theoretical literature on child labour
7, however, has not so far paid sufficient
attention to identify both the demand and supply side effects of the poverty alleviation
programs on the  problem  of child  labour  in  a  developing  economy  with  agricultural
dualism. The focus of the present paper is to examine how different policies which are
primarily designed to eradicate poverty affect the incidence of child labour in the society.
We also analyze how these policies impinge on the welfare of the child labour-supplying
families. A three-sector full-employment general equilibrium model with child labour
and agricultural dualism has been considered for the analytical purpose. The economy is
divided into two agricultural and one manufacturing sectors. One of the two agricultural
sectors is backward agriculture (sector 2) that uses child labour. In this set-up we have
examined  the consequence  of a  price  subsidy policy  (in  the  form  of  increasing  the
Minimum Support Price) designed to benefit backward agriculture and the poorer section
7 See Basu an Van (1998), Basu (1999), Gupta (2000, 2002), Jaferey and Lahiri (2002), Ranjan
(1999, 2001), Baland and Robinson (2000), Chaudhuri (2010), Chaudhuri and Dwibedi (2006,
2007), Dwibedi and Chaudhuri (2010) among others. In the literature the supply of child labour
has been attributed to factors such as abject poverty, lack of educational facilities and poor quality
of schooling, capital market imperfection, parental attitudes including the objectives to maximize
present income etc.5
of the working population on the aggregate supply of child labour in the economy. Our
analysis finds that a price subsidy to backward agriculture is most likely to produce a
perverse effect on the child labour incidence even though it raises the non-child labour
income and welfare of the child labour-supplying families. On the other hand a policy of
directly subsidizing advanced agriculture will be effective in lessening the child labour
incidence but at the cost of lowering adult income and family welfare. We advocate in
favour of policies which are favourable from the supply side as well as the demand side
of the child labour problem. For example, a policy of growth with foreign capital will
raise the income of the poorer section of the society and at the same time encourages
technologies which lower child labour demand. A strategy like this will, therefore, be
effective  in  lessening  the gravity  of  the  child  labour  problem  and  at  the  same  time
welfare-improving.
2. The model
We  consider  a  small  open  economy  with  three  sectors:  two  agricultural  and  one
manufacturing. The two agricultural sectors produce two different commodities. Sector 1
is  the  advanced  agricultural  sector  that  produces  its  output, 1 X ,  by  means  of  adult
labour( ) L , land( ) N  and capital( ) K . Capital used in this sector includes both physical
capital like tractors and harvesters and working capital required for purchasing material
inputs like fertilizers, pesticides, weedicides etc. The other agricultural sector, we call it
backward  agriculture  (sector  2),  produces  its  output, 2 X ,  using  adult labour,  child
labour( ) C L  and land. As the backward agriculture uses primitive production techniques,
we assume that Sector 2 does not require capital in its production. The land-output ratios
in  sectors  1,  and  2  ( 1 N a and 2 N a )  are  assumed  to  be  technologically  given. This
assumption not only simplifies the algebra but also can be defended as follows. In one
hectare of land the number of saplings that can be sown is given. There should be a
minimum gap between two saplings and land cannot be substituted by other factors of
production.6
It  is  sensible  to  assume  that  the  backward  agricultural  sector  is  more  adult  labour-








 , where s ji a are input-output ratios. Available empirical evidence suggests
that in developing economies child labour is used intensively directly or indirectly in
backward  agriculture  that  uses  primitive  production  techniques.  The  advanced
agricultural sector, on the other hand, uses mechanised techniques of production and does
not require child labour in production. Child labour is, therefore, specific to backward
agriculture.
8 Advanced  agriculture  is  the  export  sector  while  backward  agriculture
produces a final agricultural commodity which is consumed domestically. The price of
the latter sector’s product is administratively determined by the government.
9 In the two
agricultural sectors adult workers receive competitive wage, W . Sector 3 is the import-
competing sector that produces a manufacturing commodity, 3 X using adult labour and
capital. Child labour is not used in the manufacturing sector also. This is a formal sector
of the economy where the use of child labour is legally banned.
10 It faces a unionised
labour  market  where  workers  receive  a  contractual  wage W withW W  .  The  adult
8 See footnote 10 in this context.
9 In a developing country for protecting the interests of the small and marginal farmers and the
poorer section of the consumers the government often tinkers with market mechanism by its
procurement  and  distribution  activities.  It  declares  in  advance  the  minimum  support  prices
(MSPs)  for essential crops at which public agencies procure foodgrains and other essential crops
from farmers. On the other hand, it distributes foodgrains among the weaker section of consumers
at subsidized issue prices through its public distribution system. Another important objective of
these operations is to maintain satisfactory level of operational and buffer stocks of foodgrains to
ensure National Food Security. All these practices are being followed in a country like India. See
http://fciweb.nic.in/ for more details.
10 According  to  ILO  (2002) more  than  70  per  cent  of  economically  active  children  in  the
developing countries are engaged in agriculture and allied sectors and less than 9 per cent are
involved in manufacturing. Besides, child workers are used in informal manufacturing sector
which  constitutes  unregistered  units  that  mainly  produce  intermediate  goods  for  the  formal
manufacturing sector. However, even if one introduces an informal manufacturing sector where
child labour, adult labour and capital are used to produce a non-traded input for the formal sector
the basic results of this paper still hold under different sufficient conditions containing terms of
relative intensities in which child labour and other two inputs are used in the two child labour-
using sectors.7
labour allocation mechanism is as follows. Adult workers first try to get employment in
the manufacturing sector that offers the higher wage and those who are unable to find
employment in the said sector are automatically absorbed in the two informal sectors
11
(agricultural sectors), as the wage rate there is perfectly flexible. Capital is completely
mobile between sectors 1 and 3. Owing to the small open economy assumption prices of
the two traded commodities (1 and 3) are given internationally. Price  of the product
produced  by  backward  agriculture is  exogenous  to  the  model. Competitive  markets,
excepting the formal sector labour market, constant returns to scale (CRS) technologies
with positive and diminishing marginal productivities of inputs
12 and full-employment of
resources are assumed. Commodity 1 is chosen as the numeraire.
The  following  three  equations  present  the  zero-profit  conditions  relating  to  the  three
sectors of the economy.
1 1 1 1 L N K Wa Ra ra    (1)
2 2 2 2 L C C N Wa W a Ra P     (2)
3 3 3 L K Wa ra P   (3)
where R , r and C W   stand  for  return  to  land,  return  to  capital  and  child  wage  rate,
respectively.
Complete utilization of adult labour, capital, land and child labour imply the following
four equations, respectively.
L X a X a X a L L L    3 3 2 2 1 1 (4)
K X a X a K K   3 3 1 1 (5)
11 There is a vast theoretical literature that discusses various aspects of the informal sector in a
developing economy. This includes works of Chaudhuri and Banerjee (2007), Marjit (2003),
Chaudhuri et al. (2006), Chaudhuri (2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006 a, b, 2007, 2010 a, b, c, 2011
a, b), Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2002 a, b), Chaudhuri and Dwibedi (2007), Chaudhuri and
Yabuuchi (2010) etc.
12 The land-output ratios in the two agricultural sectors ( 1 N a and 2 N a ) have been assumed to be
technologically given. However, the other inputs exhibit CRS between themselves.8
N X a X a N N   2 2 1 1 (6)
C C L X a  2 2 (7)
While endowments of adult labour, land and  capital
13 are fixed in the  economy, the
aggregate  supply  of  child  labour, C L ,  is  endogenously  determined  from  the  utility
maximizing behavior of the households.
2.1. Household behaviour
We derive the supply function of child labour from the utility maximizing behaviour of
the representative altruistic poor household. There are Lnumbers of working families,
which are classified into two groups with respect to the earnings of their adult members.
The adult workers who work in the higher paid manufacturing sector comprise the richer
section of the working population. On the contrary, labourers who are engaged in the two
agricultural sectors constitute the poorer section. There is now considerable evidence and
theoretical reason for believing that, in developing countries, parents send their children
to work out of sheer poverty.  Following the ‘Luxury Axiom’
14 of Basu and Van (1998),
we assume that there exists a critical level of family (or adult labour) income, * W , such
that the parents will send their children out to work if and only if the actual adult wage
rate is less than this critical level. We assume that each worker in the manufacturing
sector earns a wage income,W , sufficiently higher than this critical level
15. So, these
13  The capital endowment of the economy may, however, increase in the presence of foreign
direct investment (FDI).
14  Basu  and  Van  (1998)  have  shown  that  if  child  labour  and  adult  labour  are  substitutes
(Substitution Axiom) and if child leisure is a luxury commodity to the poor households (Luxury
Axiom), unfavourable adult labour market, responsible for low adult wage rate, is the driving
force behind the incidence of child labour. According to the Luxury Axiom, there exists a critical
level of adult wage rate, and any adult worker earning below this wage rate, considers himself as
poor and does not have the luxury to send his offspring to schools. He is forced to send his
children to the job market to supplement low family income out of sheer poverty.
15 We can also quantify this critical value in our model. From equation (10) we can say that
0 C l   if






workers do not send their children to work. On the other hand, adult workers employed in
the two agricultural sectors earn W amount of wage income (we assume that this is their
only source of income excluding income from child labour), which is less than the critical
wage , * W , and therefore send many of their children to the job market to supplement
low family income. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that capital-owners and land-
owners are separate classes and they do not supply any child labour.
16
The supply function of child labour by each poor working family (all assumed to be
identical) is  determined  from  the  utility  maximizing  behaviour  of  the  representative
altruistic household who works as wage labour in any of the agricultural sectors. We
assume  that  each  working  family  consists  of  one  adult  member  and  ‘n’  number  of
children. The altruistic adult member of the family (guardian) decides the number of
children to be sent to the workplace( ) C l . The utility function of the household is given by
)) ( , , , ( 3 2 1 C l n C C C U U  
The household derives utility from the consumption of the three commodities, i C s and
from the children’s leisure. For analytical simplicity let us consider the following Cobb-
Douglas type of the utility function.
    ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 3 2 1 C l n C C C A U   (8)
with 0  A , 0 , , , 1       ; and, . 1 ) (        
It satisfies all the standard properties and it is homogeneous of degree 1.
The household maximizes its utility subject to the following budget constraint.
2 1 1 2 3 3 ( ) C C PC P C PC W l W     (9)
16 Alternatively, one can assume that rental incomes are equally divided among the L number of
working families. Consequently, share of rental incomes enters into the household maximization
exercise.10
where, W is the income of the adult worker and C Cl W measures the income from child
labour and 2 P  is the Issue Price (Consumers’ Price) of commodity 2  determined by the
government.
17
Maximizing the utility function with respect to its arguments and subject to the above
budget constraint and solving for C l the following family child labour supply function can
be derived.
18
{(1 ) ( / )} C C l n W W      (10)
From (10) it is easy to check that C l varies negatively with the adult wage rate, W . A rise
in W produces a positive income effect so that the adult worker chooses more leisure for
his children and therefore decides to send a fewer number of children to the workplace.
An increase in C W , on the other hand, implies increased opportunity cost of leisure and
therefore produces a negative substitution effect, which increases the supply of child
labour from each family.
19
In our model there are ) ( 3 3X a L L L I    number of adult workers engaged in the two
agricultural (informal) sectors  and  each  of  them  sends C l   number  of  children  to  the
workplace. Thus, the aggregate supply function of child labour in the economy is given
by
3 3 [(1 ) ( / )]( ) C C L L n W W L a X         (11)
2.2. The General Equilibrium Analysis
17 The  difference  between  the  Producers  Support  Price  and  the  Issue  Price  is  the  subsidy
multiplied by quantity of production is the burden of the government, source of which has been
kept exogenous in our model for the sake of simplicity. The subsidy may, however, be financed
by imposing lump-sum taxes on capitalists, landowners and the richer section of the working
class employed in the manufacturing sector of the economy.
18 See Appendix I for mathematical derivations.
19 It may be checked that the results of this paper hold for any utility function generating a supply
function of child labour that satisfies these two properties.11
Using (11), equation (7) can be rewritten as
2 2 3 3 [(1 ) ( / )]( ) C C L a X n W W L a X        (7.1)
The general equilibrium structure of the economy is represented by equations (1) – (6),
(7.1)  and  (11). There  are  eight  endogenous  variables  in  the  system:
1 2 3 , , , , , , C W W R r X X X and C L and the same number of independent equations (namely
equations  (1)   (6),  (7.1)  and  (11).  The  parameters  in  the  system  are:
2 3 , , , , , , , , , P P L K N W     and n. Equations (1)  (3) constitute the price system. This is
an indecomposable system with three price equations and four factor prices, , , C W W r and
R . So factor prices depend on both commodity prices and factor endowments. Given the
child wage rate, sectors 1 and 2 together effectively form a modified Heckscher-Ohlin
system as they use both adult unskilled labour and land in their production. Given the
price  and  the  unionised  wage W ,  r  is  determined  from  equation  (3).  Now
1 2 , , , , C W W R X X  and 3 X are simultaneously obtained from equation (1), (2), (4) – (6) and
(7.1).  Finally, C L is determined from (11).
3. Comparative Statics
As discussed earlier agriculture in many countries, especially backward agriculture in
developing  countries  is  supported  by different government subsidies.  The primary
objective of such a fiscal support is poverty alleviation. As these policies are designed to
benefit the poorer section of the working population, conventional wisdom suggests that
these measures will raise the adult income of the poor households which in turn will put a
brake on the problem of child labour in the society. This section is aimed at examining
the efficacy of a price subsidy policy (in the form of increasing the Minimum Support
Price) in mitigating the child labour problem in the economy.12
For determining the consequences of the price subsidy policy to backward agriculture on
factor prices and output composition after totally differentiating equations (1), (2), (4) –
(6) and (7.1) and solving by Cramer’s rule we can establish the following proposition.
20
Proposition 1: A price subsidy to backward agriculture leads to (i) increases in both
adult wage,W , and child wage, C W ; (ii) a fall in the ) / ( C W W  ratio and an expansion (a
contraction) of the backward (advanced) agricultural sector. The manufacturing sector
contracts if
12 1 1
2 1 { } 0 KL N L LL NL S S      ⁯
21.
Proposition 1 can be explained in economic terms in the following fashion. As r  is
determined  from  the  zero-profit  condition  for  sector  3  (equation  (3))  and  remains
unchanged despite a change in 2 P , sectors 1 and 2 together can effectively be regarded as
a Modified Hechscher-Ohlin subsystem (MHOSS) because they use two common inputs:
adults labour and land. The modification is due to the fact that apart from adult labour
and land sector 2 uses child labour and sector 1 uses capital as inputs.  An increase in the
producer price of commodity 2, 2 P , lowers the rate of return to land,R  and raises the
adult  wage, W following  a Stolper-Samuelson  type   effect,  as  sector  2  is  more  adult
labour-intensive  than  sector  1  with  respect  to  land. As  adult wage  rate  increases
producers in sector 1 substitute adult labour by capital while their counterparts in sector 2
substitute adult labour by child labour. As the adult labour-output ratios ( 1 L a and 2 L a ) in
the two agricultural sectors fall the availability of adult labour to the MHOSS rises that in
turn produces an expansionary (a contractionary) effect on sector 2 (sector 1) following a
20 See Appendix II for detailed derivations.
21  Here
k
ji S is  the  degree  of  substitution  between  factors j and iin  the k th  sector
with 0 
k
ji S for i j  ; and, 0
k
jj S  while ji  is the allocative share of j th input in ith sector.
Besides,
12
1 2 1 2 ( ) 0 N L L N NL           as  the  backward  agriculture  (sector  2)  is  more  adult
labour-intensive vis-à-vis the advanced agriculture (sector 1) with respect to land.13
Rybczynski type effect. As backward agriculture expands the demand for child labour
increases as child labour is specific to that sector. This raises the child wage rate ( C W ).
As both W and C W increase there would be two opposite effects on the supply of child
labour by each poor working families. It is easy to check that the proportionate increase
in child wage rate is greater than that in adult wage so that ) / ( C W W falls.
22 What happens
to sector 3 will be determined by movement of capital between sector 1 and sector 3. As
adult wage rate increases, with given rate of interest and constant land coefficient, wage-
rental  ratio  in  the  advanced  agricultural  sector  increases  and  producers  in  sector  1
substitute adult labour  by  capital  resulting  in  an  increase  in 1 K a .  But  as  sector  1  has
contracted the net effect on the use of capital in this sector is ambiguous. However, it can
be  proved  that  use  of  capital  increases (decreases) in  sector  1 (sector  3) under  the
sufficient condition that
12 1 1
2 1 { } 0 KL N L LL NL S S      . Consequently, sector 3 contracts.
23
3.1 Price subsidy to backward agriculture and incidence of child labour
For examining the implication of the subsidy policy on the incidence of child labour in
the  economy  we  use the  aggregate  child  labour  supply  function,  which  is  given  by
equation (11). We note that any policy affects the supply of child labour in two ways: (i)
through a change in the size of the adult labour force employed in the two agricultural
sectors, ) ( 3 3X a L L L I   , as these families are considered to be the suppliers of child
labour; and, (ii) through a change in C l (the number of child workers supplied by each
poor family), which results from a change in the ( / ) C W W ratio. Differentiating equation
(11) the following proposition can be proved.
24
22 This result is consistent with specific factor models. For an understanding of how return to
intersectorally mobile factors and specific factors react to changes in relative commodity prices,
one can go through Jones (1971). See Appendix II for mathematical proof.
23 Note that the capital-output ratio in sector 3 ( 3 K a ) is given asr does not change.
24 This has been mathematically proved in Appendix IV.14
Proposition 2: A price subsidy policy directed towards backward agriculture worsens
the problem of child labour in the economy either if
12 1 1
2 1 { } 0 KL N L LL NL S S      ; or if,
2 1 2 1
LC KL CC LL S S S S  .
As  explained  previously,  a price  subsidy  policy  to backward  agriculture lowers  the
) / ( C W W ratio, which in turn increases the supply of child labour from each poor working
family.  On  the  other  hand,  as  the  formal sector contracts  in  terms  of  output  and
employment  (under  the  sufficient  condition  mentioned  earlier)  the  number  of  poor
working families, which are considered to be the suppliers of child labour, ) ( 3 3X a L L  ,
increases.   So, we have a situation where there are more poor families each supplying an
increased number on child worker. Therefore, a price subsidy to backward agriculture
aggravates the problem of child labour in the society.
We now turn our attention to examine implication of a Price Support Policy to backward
agriculture on the welfare of the child labour-supplying families. We capture this using
the  family  utility  function. We  substitute  the  optimum  values  of consumption  of
commodities  ( 1 2 , C C and 3 C )  and  children’s  leisure ( ) C n l    into  the family utility
function and then totally differentiating and rearranging terms the following proposition
25
can be established.
Proposition  3: A  price  support policy to  backward  agriculture unambiguously
improves the welfare of the child labour-supplying families.
A price support given to backward agriculture raises both the adult wage, W and child
wage, C W . This generates income effect which leads to increased consumption of all the
physical commodities ( 1 2 , C C and 3 C ). The children’s leisure, ( ) C n l  , also increases due
to positive income effect. But as the opportunity cost of leisure ( C W ) rises, leisure falls
due to a negative price effect. As ) / ( C W W ratio falls, the price effect dominates over the
25 For mathematical derivation see Appendix V.15
income effect. The net outcome would be a decrease in children’s leisure and hence an
increase in the supply of child labour ( C l ) by each family. This works negatively on
welfare of the family. However, our analysis shows that the increase in family welfare
caused  due  to  rise  in  physical  commodities  dominates  over  the  decrease  in  utility
resulting from a fall in children’s leisure.
4. Quest for alternative policies
What alternative policies this theoretical analysis recommends in combating the problem
of child labour is the crucial question, the answer to which the present section attempts to
provide. We have already demonstrated that a policy which only targets the supply side
of the child labour problem may not be effective in mitigating the prevalence of the evil
in the system. This is because a policy that encourages backward agriculture to grow does
not only increase the non-child labour income  (adult income) but also boosts up the
demand for child labour. A policy that addresses the supply side as well as the demand
side of the problem is likely to be effective under the given circumstances. Mechanized
farming  should  be  encouraged  that  lowers  the  demand  for  child  labour.  One  such
alternative policy could be growth with foreign capital. To capture the effects of foreign
direct investment (FDI) flows
26 totally differentiating equations (1), (2), (4) – (6) and
(7.1) and solving by Cramer’s rule we get the following result.
27
Proposition 4: An inflow of foreign capital leads to (i) an increase in adult wage, W ;
(ii) a fall in  child wage, C W ; (iii) an increase in the ) / ( C W W  ratio; and, (iv) and an
expansion  (a  contraction)  of  the  advanced  (backward)  agricultural  sector.  The
manufacturing  sector also  expands  owing  to  capital  inflows.  All these lead  to  an
unambiguous fall in the aggregate supply of child labour in the economy.
An FDI inflow raises the capital stock of the economy. But the rate of return to capital
does not change as it is determined from equation (3). Both the capital-using sectors i.e.
26 Here foreign capital and domestic capital have been assumed to be perfect substitutes.
27 For mathematical derivations see Appendices II and III.16
sector 1 and sector 3 expand.
28 This raises the demand for adult labour. Consequently, the
adult wage in the two agricultural sectors,W , rises. This lowers the return to land,R (see
equation (1)). For supplying additional land required for expansion of sector 1, sector 2
has to contract. The contracting backward agriculture (sector 2) also supplies the extra
adult labour to the expanding other two sectors. The demand for child labour goes down
that  lowers  the  child  wage  rate, C W .  AsW rises  and C W   falls the  relative  adult  wage
) / ( C W W increases unambiguously
29 which in turn lowers the supply of child labour by
each poor working household. On the other hand, as sector 3 has expanded both in terms
of output and employment the number of poor working families engaged in the two
agricultural sectors falls.   So, we have a situation where there are fewer potential child
labour  supplying  families with  each  of  them sending  a fewer  number of  children  to
workplace. Thus, both the forces work together and result in an unambiguous fall in the
aggregate supply of child labour in the society.
The  welfare  effect  of  an  FDI  led  growth  also  works  in  favour  of  the  child  labour-
supplying families.
30 As mentioned earlier an FDI raises the competitive adult wage (W )
but lowers child wage rate ( C W ).  An increase in adult wage income generates a positive
income effect that raises consumption of all the commodities including children’s leisure,
( C n l  ). The latter rises even further as its opportunity cost ( C W ) decreases. Welfare of
each family improves unequivocally as consumption levels of all commodities including
children’s leisure increase.
It  is  worthwhile  in  this  connection  to  point  out  that  a  policy  of directly subsidizing
advanced agriculture in the form of a price and/or a credit subsidy will also be effective
in lessening the gravity of the child labour problem but at the cost of lowering the adult
28 See Appendix III.
29 See Appendix II.
30 See Appendix V for mathematical proofs of this result.17
wage rate and family welfare. A mere inspection of the price system (equations (1) – (3))
reveals that a price and/or a credit subsidy to advanced agriculture effectively raises the
relative price of commodity 1. This produces a Stolper-Samuelson effect in the MHOSS
that results in an increase in the return to land,R  and a decrease in the adult wage, W  as
sector 1 is more land-intensive  relative to sector 2 with respect to adult labour. This
produces an expansionary (a contractionary) effect on sector 1 (sector 2). As sector 2
contracts  the  demand  for  child  labour goes  down  as it  is  specific  to  this  sector.
Consequently, the child wage rate falls. It is easy to check that the proportionate fall in
child wage rate is greater than that in adult wage so that ) / ( C W W rises. This lowers the
supply of child labour by each poor working family, C l . It can be shown
31 that under the
sufficient condition that
12 1 1
2 1 { } 0 KL N L LL NL S S      sector 3 expands. So, we can have a
situation where there are a fewer families with each of them supplying a lower number of
child workers. Consequently, the aggregate supply of child labour falls at the cost of
further impoverishment
32 of the child labour supplying families. This establishes the final
proposition of the model.
Proposition 5: A price and/or a credit subsidy policy to advanced agriculture succeeds
in  bringing  down  the  prevalence  of  child  labour  in  the  society  under  the  sufficient
condition that
12 1 1
2 1 { } 0 KL N L LL NL S S      . However, this policy lowers the family welfare
of the child labour-supplying families.
5. Concluding remarks
The paper has provided a theoretical explanation as to why policies that affect only the
supply side of the child labour problem may not be able in alleviating the incidence of
31 Interested readers can easily check this after going through Appendices II and III.
32 Note that bothW and C W fall due to the policy. Aggregate income of each family unequivocally
plummets as C l falls too. As family welfare is a positive function of W and C W , (see Appendix:
V), welfare of the child labour-supplying families deteriorates.18
child  labour  in  a  developing  economy. Poverty  alleviation  programs  are  often
recommended to fight against child labour as it is thought to be an outcome of utter
poverty. It is a common belief that backward agriculture should be subsidized as poorer
groups of the working population are employed in this sector who send many of their
children out to work to supplement low family incomes. If the economic conditions of
these  people  can  be  improved  the  social  menace  of  child  could  automatically  be
mitigated. The analysis of this paper has challenged this populist belief using a three-
sector  general  equilibrium  model  with  child  labour  and  agricultural  dualism.  The
advanced agriculture is distinguished from backward agriculture as follows. The former
uses capital in the form of agricultural machineries that prevents child labour to work on
these  farms.  On  the  contrary,  backward  agriculture  uses  primitive  techniques  of
cultivation and employs child labour in a significant number. Apart from this, backward
agriculture  uses  more  labour-intensive  (adult  labour)  technique  vis-à-vis  advanced
agriculture with respect to land. In this set-up we have shown that a price subsidy policy
designed to benefit the poorer section of the working population that affects the child
labour problem only through the supply side cannot ultimately be able to deliver the
goods. Although the policy exerts a downward pressure on the child labour incidence
through the supply side by raising adult wage income it increases the demand for child
labour  through an  expansion  of  backward  agriculture.  But  as  the  demand  side  effect
dominates over the supply side effect the incidence of child labour gets a boost. On the
contrary,  a  policy  of  overall  economic  growth in  the  form  of  an  FDI  is  able  to  put
downward pressures on the child labour problem both through the demand and supply
sides. Not only it lessens the supply of child labour by raising non-child labour (adult
wage)  income  of  the  poor  families  but  also  lowers  the  demand  for  child  labour  by
expanding  (contracting)  advanced  (backward)  agriculture.  Besides,  the  policy  also
unequivocally improves  welfare  of  the  child  labour-supplying  families. Our  results,
therefore, demonstrate that liberalized investment policies should be strictly preferred to
poverty  lessening  measures  both  from  the  view  points  of  poverty  alleviation  and
reduction in the incidence of child labour in the developing nations.19
Appendix I: Derivation of family supply function of child labour
Maximizing equation (8) with respect to 3 2 1 , , C C C and C l  and subject to the budget constraint
(9) the following first-order conditions are obtained.
2 1 1 2 3 3 (( )/( )) (( )/( )) (( )/( )) (( )/( ) ) C C U PC U P C U PC U n l W                             (A.1)
From (A.1) we get the following expressions.
)} /( ) ( { 1 1 P W l n C C C                        (A.2)
2 2 { ( ) /( )} C C C n l W P                                                                                                       (A.3)
)} /( ) ( { 3 3 P W l n C C C                        (A.4)
Substitution of the values of 1 C , 2 C and 3 C into the budget constraint and further simplifications
give us the following child labour supply function of each poor working household.
{(1 ) ( / )} C C l n W W                (10)
Appendix II: Changes in factor prices
As r is determined from equation (3), it is independent of any changes in 2 P andK . In other
words, we have ˆ 0. r 
Now we totally differentiate equations (1), (2), (4) – (6) and (7.1), collecting terms and arranging
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1 2 1 2 ( ) 0 N L L N NL          as we have assumed that the backward agricultural sector is more
adult  labour-intensive  vis-à-vis  the  advanced  agricultural  sector  with  respect  to  land  both  in
physical and value sense. The latter implies that 1 2 1 2 ( ) 0 L N N L        which in turn shows that
0   .
Solving (A.5) by Cramer’s rule the following expressions are obtained.
2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ { ( ) } L LC CC N N C
C C
W
W S A S A P A K
l W

        
 
 (A.7)
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1 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ { ( ) } L LC CC L L C
C C
W
R S A S A P A K
l W

       
 
                 (A.9)
       (─)           (+)          (─)          (+)   (+)     (─)        (+)
Now subtraction of (A.8) from (A.7) yields
2 2 2 1
1 2 2 1 3 1 2
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) [ ( ) ( ) )] C L LC LL CC CL K KL N W W A S S A S S S A P          

1 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 ˆ { ( )} N C L N N L A K         

Using the expression of LL S from (A.6) we can further simplify the expression of ˆ ˆ ( ) C W W  as
follows.
1 1
1 1 1 3 1 2
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) [ ] C L LL K KL N W W A S S A P       

                       (─) (+)   (─)               (+)      (+)
1 2 1 2 1 2 3
1 ˆ { ( )} N C L N N L A K         

(A.10)
                                                  (─)                            (─)            (+)
[Note that
2 2 ( ) 0 CC CL S S    and
2 2 ( ) 0 LL LC S S   , (note that as 2 N a is constant
2 0 CN S  and
2 0 LN S  .]
Using (A.6), from (A.7) – (A.9) and (A.10) we can obtain the following results.
(i) ˆ ˆ 0, 0 W R    and ˆ 0 C W  when 2 ˆ 0 P  ;
(ii) ˆ ˆ ( ) 0 C W W    when 2 ˆ 0 P 
(iii) ˆ ˆ 0, 0 W R    and ˆ 0 C W  when ˆ 0 K  ;            (A.11)
(iv) ˆ ˆ ( ) 0 C W W     when ˆ 0 K 
Appendix III: Changes in output composition
Solving (A.5) by Cramer’s Rule we can derive the following expressions as well.22
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[We have used the expression of LL S  and note that
2 2 0 LC LL S S    and
2 2 0 CC CL S S   ]23
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                                          (─)                 (+)                      (+)
From (A.12) - (A.14) we get the following
(v) 1 2 ˆ ˆ 0, 0 X X   when 2 ˆ 0 P  ;
(vi) 3 ˆ 0 X  when 2 ˆ 0 P 
under the sufficient condition that
12 1 1
2 1 { } 0 KL N L LL NL S S             (A.15)
(vii) 1 2 ˆ ˆ 0, 0 X X   when ˆ 0 K  ;
(viii) 3 ˆ 0 X  when ˆ 0 K  .
Also note that 3 3 ˆ ˆ K X  where 3 3 3 K K a X   (this is because 3 ˆ 0 K a  ). So,
(ix) 3 ˆ 0 K  when 2 ˆ 0 P  ; and, (A.16)
(x) 3 ˆ 0 K  when ˆ 0 K  .24
Appendix IV: Proof of proposition 3
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We now substitute the expressions of 3 ˆ X   and ˆ ˆ ( ) C W W     from (A.14) and (A.10) respectively
to get the following expression.
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                                          (+)                     (─)                 (+)                   (─)  (+)
From (A.17) we get the following results.
ˆ 0 C L  when 2 ˆ 0 P   under the sufficient condition
12 1 1
2 1 { } 0 KL N L LL NL S S     
Rewriting (A.17) in a different way it can be checked that the above result also hold under the
sufficient condition that
2 1 2 1
LC KL CC LL S S S S  .
Appendix V: Effects on family welfare
We  substitute  the  optimum  values  of  consumption  of  commodities  ( 1 2 , C C and 3 C )  (from
equations (A.2)-(A.4)) and children’s leisure ( ) C n l  ( from equation (10)) into the utility
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 where V stands for family welfare and
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Totally differentiating the above expression we get the following.










                                                 (A.19)
From the above expression it is clear that family welfare is an increasing function of both
W and C W .
We now substitute ˆ W and ˆ
C W  from (A.7) and (A.8) into (A.19) to get the following.
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Now from (A.20) we have
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(obtained after using (4), (7), (10) and (11).)
From (A.20) and (A.21) we can obtain the following results.
(i) ˆ 0 V   when 2 ˆ 0 P  ;
(ii) ˆ 0 V   when ˆ 0 K  .26
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